Appellate Rule 16(b): The Scope of Review in an Appeal Based Solely upon a Dissent in the Court of Appeals by Fowler, Thomas L.
North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 24
Number 1 Volume 24, Numbers 1 & 2 Article 3
4-1-2001
Appellate Rule 16(b): The Scope of Review in an
Appeal Based Solely upon a Dissent in the Court of
Appeals
Thomas L. Fowler
Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fowler, Thomas L. (2001) "Appellate Rule 16(b): The Scope of Review in an Appeal Based Solely upon a Dissent in the Court of
Appeals," North Carolina Central Law Review: Vol. 24 : No. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol24/iss1/3
APPELLATE RULE 16(b): THE SCOPE OF REVIEW IN
AN APPEAL BASED SOLELY UPON A DISSENT IN
THE COURT OF APPEALS
THOMAS L. FOWLERt
Appellate courts perform two important functions: (a) correcting
errors that occurred at the trial level, and (b) clarifying, standardizing,
and developing the rules and principles of law that apply in the juris-
diction.' The error correction function is of primary benefit to the
aggrieved litigant because it addresses the adequacy or fairness of the
legal proceedings that determined the litigant's rights, even if the legal
issues involved are of little interest or significance to the greater com-
munity.2 The law development function is of primary benefit to the
community at large because it resolves the legal issues that have sig-
nificance beyond the case in which the issue arose.'
t Director, Judges' Legal Research Program, Administrative Office of the Courts, Ra-
leigh, North Carolina; B.A.. 1975: J.D., 1980, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The
views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect any position of the
Administrative Office of the Courts. Portions of this article were previously published in the
author's article "Of Moons, Thongs, Holdings and Dicta: State v. Fly and the Rule of Law," 22
CAMPBELL L. REV 253 (2000).
1. Standards Relating to Court Organization Section 1.13 (American Bar Association,
1990) (defining the two basic functions of appellate courts as (a) error correction: reviewing trial
court proceedings to determine whether they have been conducted according to law and applica-
ble procedure, and (b) law development: developing the rules of law that are within the compe-
tence of the judicial branch to announce and interpret).
2. The importance of the error correction function has been explained as follows:
"[A]ppellate courts serve as the instrument of accountability for those who make the basic deci-
sions in trial courts and administrative agencies .... The availability of the appellate process
assures the decision-makers at the first level that their correct judgments will not be, or appear
to be, the unconnected actions of isolated individuals, but will have the concerted support of the
legal system: and it assures litigants that the decision in their case is not prey to the failings of
whichever mortal happened to render it, but bears the institutional imprimatur and approval of
the whole social order as represented by its legal system. Thus, the review for correctness serves
to reinforce the dignity, authority, and acceptability of the trial, and to control the adverse ef-
fects of any personal shortcomings of the basic decisionmakers." PAUL D. CARRINCTON ET AL.,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2 (1976).
3. The importance of the law development function has been explained as follows: "With-
out appellate review, such great divergences in practices and variation in results would arise
between trial courts in the same system that they would jeopardize the belief that legal principles
are a vital force in their decisions or provide a basis for predicting the application of official
power. Accordingly, appellate courts are needed to announce, clarify, and harmonize the rules
of decision employed by the legal system in which they serve." Id. at 2-3.
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Our legal system generally grants litigants the right to one appellate
review of their case' in recognition of the importance of the error cor-
rection function. If an aggrieved litigant chooses to exercise this ap-
peal of right, the appellate court must hear the case even if no
significant legal issues are involved. Yet an appellate court has a finite
capacity to hear, consider, and resolve cases. The more cases an ap-
pellate court must hear pursuant to an appeal of right that involve
issues of significance only to the litigants themselves, the less time that
court will spend on its law development function, to the detriment of
the greater community. As litigation, and the corresponding exercise
of appeals of right, dramatically increased during the twentieth cen-
tury,5 concern grew over how to protect the law development function
of each jurisdiction's appellate court.6 Of the various proposed re-
sponses, the one ultimately adopted by most jurisdictions7 was the cre-
ation of an intermediate appellate court that would hear most of the
appeals of right and would thus be charged with the responsibility of
fulfilling the error correction function. Creating an intermediate ap-
pellate court to provide the one opportunity for appellate review
4. See State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 304, 163 S.E.2d 376, 382 (1968) (noting the basic
principle that there should be one trial on the merits and one appeal on the law, as of right, in
every case-and that double appeals of right should be avoided except in the most unusual cases,
the importance of which may be said to justify a second review). See also CARRINGTON ET" AL.,
supra note 3, at 136 ("[W]e ...are prone to accept the view that successive appeals of right
should be very sparingly authorized. Not only are they a burden to the smooth functioning of
the highest courts, but they are also a burden to the unwilling successful litigants who should be
spared the cost of continued litigation in the absence of some fairly substantial public interest in
the case.").
5. Former North Carolina Governor and North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Daniel K.
Moore stated in an interview:
[I] n the late 1950s the [North Carolina] Supreme Court was issuing more than 300 formal
opinions per year .... By the 1964-65 term, that number had grown to more than 450 per
year for the seven-person court. In 1968, the first year of the Court of Appeals, that six-
person court filed almost 400 opinions; in 1970 the number of opinions filed by the supreme
court had fallen to just over 100. By the early 1990s, the twelve-person court of appeals was
disposing of roughly 1,500 cases per year, over ninety percent by opinion. At the same time,
the supreme court issued opinions in roughly 200 cases per year.
Pat Devine, Reflections from Daniel K. Moore, 3 JURIDICUS 9, 12 n.6 (June 1998).
6. In the early 1930s several commentators (noting the increasing case load of the North
Carolina Supreme Court) suggested possible sources of relief. See, e.g., H.B. Parker & C.T.
McCormick, Does Our Supreme Court Need Relief?, 8 N.C. L .REV. 487, 488-89 (1930) (mention-
ing (1) increasing the number of justices from five to seven, (2) creating an intermediate appel-
late court, (3) providing for assignment of trial judges to sit, from time to time, as temporary
members of the supreme court, and (4) providing for the appointment of "skilled young lawyers
as law assistants, law clerks, or 'referenders,' for each of the members of the supreme court, to
save the time of the justice by performing a part of the preliminary legal research preparatory to
writing opinions."); Susie M. Sharp, Supreme Court Sitting In Divisions, 10 N.C. L. REV. 351
(1932) (discussing the possibility of allowing the supreme court to sit in divisions).
7. See generally MARLIN 0. OSTHUS, STATE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS 2 (1980);
Joy A. CHAPPER & ROGER A. HANSON, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS: IMPROVING CASE
PROCESSING V. (1990) (chronicling the development of state intermediate courts of appeal).
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deemed sufficient to fulfill the error correction function' freed the
highest appellate court from the necessity of hearing appeals of right.
Instead, the highest appellate court could focus on its law develop-
ment function by choosing which cases it would review, selecting only
those cases which involved legal issues having significance beyond the
case in which the issue arose. This was the system adopted by the
federal courts in 19259 and by many of the states.'0
1. NORTH CAROLINA'S Two-TIER APPELLATE COURT SYSTEM
North Carolina created its intermediate appellate court, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals,"' in 1967 to join its court of last resort, the
North Carolina Supreme Court. 2 Under this two-tier appellate court
system, trial court decisions are generally appealable as a matter of
right to the court of appeals. t3 Further appeal to the supreme court is
generally not a matter of right. Instead, the appellant must ask the
supreme court to review the court of appeals' decision by filing a peti-
tion for discretionary review." The court grants or denies the motion,
in its discretion, based on factors set out by statute: (a) the significant
8. See State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 304, 163 S.E.2d 376, 382 (1968). The court stated:
[I]n establishing the North Carolina Court of Appeals, defining its jurisdiction, and provid-
ing a system of appeals, the Courts Commission was guided, inter alia, by the basic principle
that there should be one trial on'the merits and one appeal on the law, as of right, in every
case. The Commission sought to avoid double appeals as of right, except in the most unusual
cases, the importance of which may be said to justify a second review (citation omitted).
Id.
9. See Federal Judiciary Act, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 938 (1925) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C., 1940 ed. §§ 346, 347) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1254): see also PAUL D. CAR-
RINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 3-4 (1976). The author stated:
[T]he Federal Judiciary Act of 1925 conferred on the Supreme Court of the United States
the power to refuse to hear many of the appeals which it had formerly been required to
hear. It was the premise of that reform that the highest Court would continue to hear the
cases which are of institutional importance, but would decline to hear cases which are of
importance only to the individuals affected, thus leaving the function of review of district
court decisions for correctness to the intermediate courts.
Id.
10. See Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Discretionary Review of the Decisions of Intermediate Appellate
Courts: A Comparison of Florida's System with Those of the Other States and the Federal System,
45 FLA. L REv. 21, 27 (1993) ("[W]hen appellate workload outruns the ability of the supreme
court to handle it, the most common solution has been to create an intermediate appellate court.
... By 1957, thirteen states had intermediate appellate courts .... By 1980, the number had
grown to thirty-two, and at present there are thirty-nine.").
11. N.C. CONST., art. IV, § 7; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-16 (1967).
12. N.C. CONST., art. IV, § 6: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-10 (1967).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (providing that defendants convicted of first degree murder
and sentenced to death may appeal of right directly to the supreme court. Other final judgments
and certain interlocutory orders of the trial courts are appealable by right to the court of ap-
peals). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-29 (regarding appeals of right to the court of appeals
from final orders or decisions of various administrative agencies).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (providing that if there is no appeal of right and the party fails
to timely file a petition for discretionary review, the party can still seek appellate review by
petitioning for a writ of certiorari). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-32(b); N.C. R. APP. P. 2 1(a).
3
Fowler: Appellate Rule 16(b): The Scope of Review in an Appeal Based Sole
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2001
4 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
public interest in the subject matter of the appeal; (b) the significance
to the jurisprudence of the state of the legal principles involved; and
(c) consideration of whether the decision of the court of appeals con-
flicts with a decision of the supreme court.' 5 The supreme court de-
nies the majority of petitions for discretionary review. 6
As noted above, the principle behind North Carolina's system is
twofold. First, individual litigants should have the right to appellate
review of their case in order to correct trial errors. Second, the North
Carolina Supreme Court's finite capacity to hear cases must be ra-
tioned and is properly utilized in cases where the subject matter or
legal issues in the case have an importance beyond that of the individ-
ual litigant's interest in correcting trial error." Litigants are thus pro-
vided with the right to one appellate review of any issue properly
preserved 8 and appealed, which review will be performed, in most
cases, by the court of appeals. Subsequent review by the supreme
court, however, is reserved for those few cases that significantly im-
pact or develop the law. For these cases, any benefit of the supreme
court's review to the particular litigants is only incidental, at least in-
sofar as the court's discretionary decision to review is concerned.
Allowing the highest court in the system to choose which cases it
will review on the basis of broader significance has benefited the wor-
kloads of the supreme courts in each jurisdiction, even allowing for
the parties' ability to file a petition for discretionary review. As one
commentator has noted:
First, there is a significant attrition in cases after the court of appeals
renders a decision. For many reasons, in numerous cases the parties
do not seek further review in the supreme court. Second, petitions for
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c). See also N.C. R. App. P. 15 (a) (stating that "[e]ither prior
to or following determination by the court of appeals of an appeal docketed in that court, any
party to the appeal may in writing petition the supreme court upon any grounds specified in G.S.
7A-31 to certify the cause for discretionary review by the supreme court.") The grounds for
allowing discretionary review prior to court of appeal's decisions are set out in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-31(b).
16. This can be confirmed by consulting the list of cases noted under the "Petitions for
Discretionary Review" heading in the front of each volume of the North Carolina Reports.
17. The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Court Organization found that
the two basic functions of appellate courts, error correction (i.e., reviewing trial court proceed-
ings to determine whether they have been conducted according to law and applicable procedure)
and law development (developing the rules of law that are within the competence of the judicial
branch to announce and interpret), were advanced by placing the primary responsibility for er-
ror correction with the intermediate appellate court (through granting the litigants an appeal of
right to the intermediate appellate court) and placing the primary responsibility for law develop-
ment with the supreme court (by allowing the supreme court to selectively review cases based on
their special significance). See ABA Standards Relating to Court Organization § 1.13 (1990).
18. "In order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party must have presented the
trial court with a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling
sought if the specific grounds are not apparent." N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). See also State v.
Flippen, 349 N.C. 264, 276, 506 S.E.2d 702. 709 (1998).
[Vol. 24:1
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discretionary review can be read and decided quickly, in a fraction of
the time necessary for consideration of a plenary appeal on the merits.
Such review focuses initially on the question of whether jurisdiction
should be accepted, and in the great majority of cases results in an
order denying review. The task of determining whether to exercise
discretionary review is an important element of the supreme court's
workload, but the time expended per individual case is very small.
Third, in practice supreme courts actually grant discretionary review
in only a small percentage of the cases where it is requested. The net
effect of the two-tier system is to shift the time-consuming review-for-
correctness function to the court of appeals and to streamline the su-
preme court's workload.' 9
Jurisdictions with the two-tier appellate court system often provide
in rules, statutes, or in their constitution, criteria to guide the supreme
court in its exercise of its discretionary decision to review intermedi-
ate appellate court decisions. 20 Some states' discretionary review cri-
teria include consideration of whether or not there was a dissent in the
intermediate court.2 1 Although generally consistent with other juris-
dictions' two-tier systems, North Carolina treats dissents differently.
In North Carolina, a dissent in the court of appeals triggers an unqual-
ified right to appeal to the supreme court.2
II. NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL STATUTES SECTION 7A-30(2):
APPEAL OF RIGHT BASED SOLELY UPON DISSENT IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
North Carolina General Statutes Section 7A-30(2) provides that the
parties to a case decided by the North Carolina Court of Appeals
have a right to subsequent review by the North Carolina Supreme
Court if "there is a dissent. ' 23 This language could be interpreted to
allow appeal of right to the supreme court of all properly preserved
issues in the case as there is no express limitation on the issues that
can be appealed. Nevertheless, such a broad reading of this language
would appear inconsistent with the purposes of the two-tier appellate
court system. In context, the more logical interpretation is that the
19. See Cope, supra note 11, at 30.
20. For a general discussion of these criteria, see the article by Judge Cope, supra note 11.
21. See Cope, supra note 11, at 59.
22. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 7A-30(2). Judge Cope notes that Missouri, New Jersey, Texas and
New York also appear to provide for an appeal of right when there is a dissent in the intermedi-
ate appellate court. See Cope, supra note 11, at 104 n.234.
23. § 7A-30(2). This language has not changed since the adoption of section 7A-30 in 1967.
This statute also provides for an appeal of right from a decision of the court of appeals even
when the three court of appeals judges agree on the disposition of a case if the decision
"[d]irectly involves a substantial question arising under" either the United States or the North
Carolina constitutions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(1).
2001]
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appeal of right should be limited to the issue or issues on which the
court of appeals panel disagreed.
The first purpose of the two-tier system is to provide the litigant
with one opportunity for appellate review to correct trial error-that
is, the appeal of right to the court of appeals. The adequacy of this
one opportunity for appellate review might well be questioned if the
three judges on the court of appeals panel which decided the case dis-
agree as to whether or not there was trial error. It is not unreasonable
to extend to those litigants the right to a second appellate review to
resolve the issue upon which the three court of appeals judges dis-
agreed. In such cases, the lack of unanimity undermines the authority
of the first appellate review and the individual litigant's interest in
correcting trial error may justify a small encroachment on the wor-
kload of the supreme court. This reasoning, however, would apply
only to the specific areas of disagreement by the court of appeals
judges. To the extent the judges were unanimous, the appellant would
have received his one opportunity for review, subject of course, to the
possibility of filing a petition for discretionary review with the su-
preme court.
The second purpose of the system, avoiding burdening the supreme
court with cases that involve matters of importance only to the indi-
vidual litigants, is also addressed by the more narrow interpretation of
section 7A-30(2). If the three court of appeals judges disagree on a
specific issue, that issue may be deserving of final resolution by the
supreme court because that disagreement is likely to serve as the basis
for future litigation by other parties concerned with the same legal
issue. Resolution of the matter, much like the U.S. Supreme Court's
resolution of disagreements between the federal circuits, might well
be expected to develop the law and resolve issues of significance be-
yond the individual interests of the litigants. Again, this would not be
so if the issues subject to the appeal of right included issues upon
which the court of appeals' panel was in agreement. The court of ap-
peals' unanimity on an issue would not generally portend or cause
future litigation on the issue by others. Finally, it is clear that entitling
a party to appeal as of right all issues in a case, rather than the limited
issue or issues on which the court of appeals panel disagreed, would
significantly increase the supreme court's workload by forcing it to
review issues upon which the court of appeals reached a unanimous
decision. Such issues may have been important only to the individual
litigants involved in the case, precisely the situation that the two-tier
system sought to address and avoid.
[Vol. 24:1
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III. CASES INTERPRETING SECTION 7A-30(2): WILL UNANIMITY
BLOCK REVIEW BY APPEAL OF RIGHT?
In a 1971 case, Hendrix v. Alsop,24 the North Carolina Supreme
Court considered whether an appeal of right based on a dissent al-
lowed review by the supreme court of all matters or issues in the case,
as might be argued based on the language of the statute. In Hendrix,
the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's actions against each of the three
defendants. The North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of the action as to two defendants but
divided as to the dismissal of a third defendant, with two judges find-
ing that dismissal improper. The third defendant appealed as a matter
of right based on the dissent. The plaintiff also appealed the dismis-
sals as to the first two defendants as a matter of right based on the fact
that there was a dissent in the case. The supreme court rejected the
argument that plaintiff could appeal these dismissals as a matter of
right and interpreted section 7A-30(2) to require a review only "of
questions on which there was a division in the intermediate appellate
court."25 Limiting Hendrix v. Alsop to its facts, the narrow holding
was that the appeal of right based on a dissent as to one "claim" does
not extend to other "claims" upon which there was no dissent. The
Hendrix analysis, however, indicated this principle might also extend
to questions or issues in the case that were not the basis of any disa-
greement on the part of the court of appeals' panel.26
In a 1980 case, Williams v. Williams,27 however, the supreme court
squarely stated that when considering an appeal of right pursuant to
section 7A-30(2), it was "not limited, in reviewing a decision of the
Court of Appeals, to a consideration of only such matters as may be
mentioned by the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals' opin-
ion."28 In Williams, the trial court ordered defendant to pay alimony,
child support, attorneys fees and expenses. The court of appeals re-
versed the award of alimony, counsel fees, and expenses, and vacated
and remanded the award of child support. In a brief dissent, Judge
Erwin stated that he agreed "with all portions of the majority's opin-
ion EXCEPT that portion which reverses the award of alimony to the
plaintiff. I vote to affirm the award of alimony on the grounds that
24. 278 N.C. 549, 180 S.E.2d 802 (1971).
25. Id. at 554, 180 S.E.2d at 806.
26. The Hendrix language extending the principle to "questions" rather than just to
"claims" was picked up in a 1972 case, State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 128. 191 S.E.2d 752, 755
(1972) ("By this enactment the General Assembly of North Carolina intended to insure a review
by the Supreme Court of questions on which there was a division in the intermediate appellate
court.").
27. 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980).
28. Id. at 190, 261 S.E.2d at 860.
2001]
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the finding of fact by the trial judge was supported by competent evi-
dence and that the defendant is the supporting spouse.
'"29
On appeal, the supreme court explicitly agreed with Judge Erwin's
dissent and reversed the court of appeals on that issue. But defendant
apparently also argued the propriety of the court of appeals' ruling as
to child support. Plaintiff responded in her brief by stating that the
child support provisions of the trial court's order were not involved in
the appeal "since the dissent in the court of appeals was only with
regards to the decision on alimony."3 As noted above, the supreme
court expressly rejected this argument. The court nevertheless de-
clined to consider the child support issue because the parties did not
address the issue in their briefs and such issue was therefore deemed
abandoned pursuant to appellate rule.31
Williams thus adopted the expansive reading of section 7A-30(2)-
that the existence of a dissent is simply a condition precedent that
establishes the right to appeal all issues in the case that have been
otherwise properly preserved and presented for review. Despite the
logical appeal of the narrower reading, Williams established that the
court of appeals' unanimity on an issue did not block review of such
issue pursuant to an appeal of right based on a dissent. Superficially,
Williams was consistent with a supreme court case that considered the
scope of appeal under section 7A-30(1), which allowed an appeal of
right when the court of appeals' decision directly involved a substan-
tial question arising under the state or federal constitution. In State v.
Colson,3 2 the court stated the initial question before it as: If the case
presents a substantial constitutional question, "does the [North Caro-
lina] Supreme Court consider only the constitutional questions and
nothing else, or may it pass upon all assignments of error allegedly
committed by the [North Carolina] Court of Appeals and properly
brought forward for review?"33 After a survey of cases from other
jurisdictions, Colson held that once involvement of a substantial con-
stitutional question is established, the supreme court could, "in its dis-
cretion, pass upon any or all assignments of error, constitutional or
otherwise, allegedly committed by the court of appeals and properly
presented ... for review."34 But Colson should be distinguished from
Williams on two grounds. First, Colson was clear that review of non-
constitutional questions was permitted in the court's discretion, and
29. Williams v.Williams, 42 N.C. App. 163, 168, 256 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1979) (Erwin, J.,
dissenting).
30. Williams. 299 N.C. at 190. 261 S.E.2d at 860.
31. Id. (looking at N.C. R. App. P. 28(a)).
32. 274 N.C. 295. 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968).
33. Id. at 301. 163 S.E.2d at 380.
34. Id. at 305. 163 S.E.2d at 383.
[Vol. 24:1
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not as a matter of right. Williams is less clear as to whether the appel-
lant has the right to raise other issues or whether the court may, but
need not, consider such other issues. Second, the expansive interpre-
tation of the scope of appeal makes sense as applied to section 7A-
30(1) because it furthers the basic principle that the appellate courts
should avoid addressing constitutional questions if the matter is prop-
erly resolved on non-constitutional grounds.35 The expansive inter-
pretation makes less sense when the basis for the appeal is not
significant constitutional questions, but simply a court of appeals'
dissent.
The Williams approach also was consistent with a practice of the
court of appeals' judges throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. During
this time, it was not uncommon for dissenting court of appeals' judges
to simply note their dissent to an opinion without giving any explana-
tion or specifying any basis for their disagreement with the majority.36
Clearly, in such cases, it is not possible for the supreme court to limit
its review of the case to the express point of disagreement between
the dissenter and the majority when the dissenting judge simply states:
"I dissent." It may be that the supreme court, frustrated with this
practice of court of appeals' dissenters, considered approaches that
might encourage the dissenting court of appeals' judge to articulate
the basis for his or her dissent, thereby assisting the supreme court in
focusing its review on the specific area of disagreement, rather than
holding a de novo review of all possible disagreements the dissenter
might have had with the majority.
35. See Jackson v. A Woman's Choice, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 590, 595, 503 S.E.2d 422, 425-26
(1998) (where a statute is subject to two constructions, one of which would raise a serious consti-
tutional question, the court should adopt the construction which avoids the constitutional prob-
lem); State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 498, 495 S.E.2d 700, 705 (1998); see also State v. Creason, 313
N.C. 122, 127, 326 S.E.2d 24, 27 (1985) (supreme court is not required to pass upon a constitu-
tional issue unless it affirmatively appears that the issue was raised and determined in the trial
court).
36. There are many examples in the North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports. The follow-
ing is a random selection of cases where a judge simply noted a dissent without any stated basis:
Pergerson v. Williams, 9 N.C. App. 512, 518, 176 S.E.2d 885, 889 (1970) (Vaughn. J., dissenting):
Ross v. Perry, 12 N.C. App. 47, 54, 182 S.E.2d 655, 659 (1971) (Brock, J., dissenting): Braswell v.
Purser, 16 N.C. App. 14, 28, 190 S.E.2d 857. 866 (1972) (Mallard, C.J., dissenting); Lane v. Scar-
borough, 19 N.C. App. 32. 35, 198 S.E.2d 45, 47 (1973) (Brock, J., dissenting); Yount v. Lowe, 24
N.C. App. 48, 51, 209 S.E.2d 867, 869 (1974) (Morris, J., dissenting) Utilities Comm. v. Merchan-
dising Corp., 26 N.C. App. 617. 619, 216 S.E.2d 868, 869 (1975) (Britt, J., dissenting); Electric Co.
v. Pennell, 31 N.C. App. 510, 513, 229 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1976) (Brock, C.J., dissenting); Student
Bar Association v. Byrd, 32 N.C. App. 530, 536, 232 S.E.2d 855, 859 (1977) (Hedrick, J., dissent-
ing); Coble v. Coble, 44 N.C. App. 327, 331, 261 S.E.2d 34, 36 (1979) (Martin, J. dissenting);
Carrington v. Townes, 53 N.C. App. 649, 663, 281 S.E.2d 765, 774 (1981) (Martin, J., dissenting).
2001]
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IV. AMENDMENT TO APPELLATE RULE 16
The North Carolina Supreme Court is authorized to prescribe rules
of practice and procedure for all litigation in the appellate division.37
If there is a conflict with the statutes, the rules of appellate procedure
promulgated by the supreme court will prevail.38 Thus, even without
the legislature amending the language of section 7A-30(2) or the su-
preme court reversing or modifying Williams, the case that interpreted
section 7A-30(2) to not limit the scope of review, the supreme court
possessed the power to alter section 7A-30(2) by appellate rule. In
1983 the supreme court did so by amending Rule 16 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, entitled "Scope of Review of Decisions of Court
of Appeals." The amendment provided that in cases where the only
ground for the appeal of right is a dissent in the court of appeals,
review by the supreme court is limited to the questions "specifically
set out in the dissenting opinion as the basis for that dissent."3 9 Al-
though other questions may be presented to and considered by the
supreme court through a petition for discretionary review,4 ° the lan-
guage of this amendment to Rule 16 appeared to clearly limit the re-
view to the expressed grounds upon which the dissenter disagreed
with the majority's holding.41 Matters upon which the court of ap-
37. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2), ("The Supreme Court shall have exclusive authority to
make rules of procedure and practice for the Appellate Division."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-33.
38. Duke Power Co. v. Winebarger, 300 N.C. 57, 69, 265 S.E.2d 227, 234 (1980); State v.
Furmage, 250 N.C. 616, 624, 109 S.E.2d 563, 569 (1959) ("It has been held that the exclusive
power to establish its own rules of practice and procedure is vested in the Supreme Court by
Article I, Section 8, and Article IV, Section 12, and that the General Assembly has no power to
modify the rules so established."); see discussion in Jane Wylie Saunders, Appellate Rule 16(b)
and C.C. Walker Grading & Hauling, Inc. v. S.R.F. Management Corp.: New Requirements for
Appeals of Right, 63 N.C. L. REV. 1074 (1985).
39. N.C. R. App. P. 16(b).
40. Id.
41. See Jones v. All American Life Ins. Co., 312 N.C. 725,325 S.E.2d 237 (1985) (A majority
of the panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with one judge dissenting on the
grounds (1) that the evidence was insufficient to establish that plaintiff either killed or procured
the killing of the decedent Hilliard and (2) that the submission of an issue phrased in the disjunc-
tive deprived plaintiff of her right to a unanimous verdict. Pursuant to Rule 16(b) of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, only these two issues were before the court for review.); see also Blumen-
thal v. Lynch. Sec. of Revenue, 315 N.C. 571, 577-78, 340 S.E.2d 358, 361 (1986). The court held:
Although plaintiff is clearly entitled to bring an appeal by the terms of N.C.G.S. 7A-30(2),
only the issue raised in the dissent is properly before this Court for review.... This Court's
appellate review is properly limited to the single issue addressed in the dissent, and we
strongly disapprove of and discourage attempts by appellate counsel to bring additional
issues before this Court without its appropriate order allowing counsel's motion to allow
review of additional issues. Nevertheless, on rare occasions, when, as here, issues of impor-
tance ... require a decision in the public interest, this Court will exercise its inherent
residual power or its authority under Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure and address those issues though they are not properly raised on appeal.
10
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peals' panel were in agreement would thus not be before the supreme
court in appeals of right based solely upon a dissent.
This conclusion was affirmed by the supreme court in the first case
that applied Rule 16(b) in 1984. In Walker Grading & Hauling v.
S.R.F. Management Corp.,42 the trial court's order granting summary
judgment for defendant was upheld by a two judge majority of the
court of appeals. The third judge on the panel noted his dissent but
wrote no dissenting opinion. Based on the dissent the plaintiff ap-
pealed as a matter of right. The supreme court dismissed the appeal
holding that Rule 16(b) required that the dissent specify the basis for
the dissent.43 The court stated that review by the supreme court in
such cases was never intended for claims on which the court of ap-
peals had rendered "unanimous decisions, 44 and further, "[w]here an
appeal of right is taken to this Court based solely on a dissent in the
[North Carolina] Court of Appeals and the dissenter does not set out
the issues upon which he bases his disagreement with the majority, the
appellant has no issue properly before this [North Carolina Supreme]
Court."45 Such appeals are subject to dismissal because application of
this procedural amendment to Rule 16 "precludes further review by
appeal of right.
46
In another 1984 case, the court appeared to confirm its intention to
narrowly limit the appeals of right available for cases in which there
was a dissent. In Harris v. Maready,47 the plaintiff appealed, pursuant
to section 7A-30(2), because the court of appeals' decision included
two opinions which were labeled concurrences in part and dissents in
part.48 The defendants argued that the two concurring opinions were
mislabeled as dissents. The supreme court agreed, noting that all
42. 311 N.C. 170, 316 S.E.2d 298 (1984).
43. Despite this holding, the supreme court heard the matter (and reversed the court of
appeals) by certifying certain issues for discretionary review on its own motion. Id. at 176, 316
S.E.2d at 301.
44. Id. at 175, 316 S.E.2d 301 (1984). See also State v. Kimbrell, 320 N.C. 762, 767, 360
S.E.2d 691, 693 (1987) where the court held:
The Court of Appeals was unanimous in finding that admission of this evidence was error.
[citations omitted]. The panel divided, however, in its assessment of the evidence's prejudi-
cial effect. The question of the prejudicial effect of the evidence was the only issue ad-
dressed in the dissent, and under Rule 16(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure, that issue is the only one before us.
Id.
45. C.C. Walker Grading & Hauling, 311 N.C. at 176, 316 S.E.2d at 301.
46. Id. This was also the result in State v. Bowen, 312 N.C. 79, 320 S.E.2d 405 (1984), where
Chief Judge Vaughn (later Justice Vaughn) had dissented without an opinion in State v. Bowen,
67 N.C. App. 512, 313 S.E.2d 196, 197 (1984). The supreme court held: "There being no issue
before this Court for review as required by Rule 16(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the appeal is dismissed." Id.
47. 311 N.C. 536, 319 S.E.2d 912 (1984).
48. Harris v. Maready, 64 N.C. App. 1, 16-17, 306 S.E.2d 799. 808-09 (1983) (Webb, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Arnold, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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three court of appeals' judges agreed that the plaintiff's actions
against both defendants should have been dismissed but differed only
as to why the dismissal was proper. Because all three judges agreed
that the case should have been dismissed, the decision was not one in
which there was a dissent, and there was no right of appeal pursuant
to section 7A-30 (2). 49
From 1984 until 1996 the case law consistently interpreted
Rulel6(b) to restrict the supreme court's review under section 7A-
30(2) to the issue or issues expressly raised by the dissent as the basis
for its disagreement with the majority.5"
49. Maready, 311 N.C. at 537, 319 S.E.2d at 914 (1984); see also State v. Monroe, 330 N.C.
433, 435. 410 S.E.2d 913, 914 (1991). The court stated:
The defendant contends here that since the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals
reaches the same result as that reached by the majority, it does not constitute a 'dissent'
entitling the State to appeal to this Court as a matter of right under N.C.G.S. 7A-30(2). We
assume arguendo that the defendant is correct.
Id.
50. See Clifford v. River Bend Plantation, Inc., 312 N.C. 460, 463, 323 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1984)
("When an appeal is taken pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-30 (2). the only issues properly before
the Court are those on which the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals based his dissent.");
Penley v. Penley, 314 N.C. 1, 10, 332 S.E.2d 51, 57 (1985) ("Because plaintiff's appeal is based
solely on the existence of a dissent in the Court of Appeals, the scope of our review on plaintiffs
appeal is limited to the issues raised in that dissent."); State v. Hooper, 318 N.C. 680, 681-82, 351
S.E.2d 286, 287 (1987). The court stated:
Defendant contends that Officer Reed's remark that defendant had 'stopped . . . and as-
serted his Constitutional rights' was a violation of those rights. The Court of Appeals agreed
and awarded defendant a new trial. Judge (now Justice) Webb dissented on the grounds that
he did not believe the admission of Officer Reed's statement was prejudicial error. When an
appeal is taken pursuant to N.C.G.S. 7A-30(2), the scope of this Court's review is properly
limited to the issue upon which the dissent in the Court of Appeals diverges from the opin-
ion of the majority [citation omitted]. Because the Court of Appeals panel agreed that
Officer Reed's testimony violated defendant's constitutional rights, we do not address this
question. We examine only whether any error in admitting this testimony was prejudicial.
Id.; Smith v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 321 N.C. 60, 63, 361 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1987). The
court stated:
Rule 16 (b) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure limits the scope of review
in appeals based solely on a dissent to those issues that are specifically given as the basis for
the dissenting opinion. Therefore, the only issue properly before this Court is whether the
Court of Appeals correctly applied Great American I, even though the defendant raises
other issues in its brief.
Id.; Murrow v. Daniels, 321 N.C. 494, 496, 364 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1988) (scope of review under
G.S. 7A-30(2) limited to issue address in dissent); Triangle Leasing Co. v. McMahon, 327 N.C.
224, 228, 393 S.E.2d 854, 857 (1990) ("Because the sole question raised in Judge Cozort's dissent
concerns the reasonableness of the contract as to time and territory, the plaintiff's likelihood of
meeting its burden of proof on the remaining criteria for determining the enforceability of this
contract is not before this Court."); Brooks v. Hackney, 329 N.C. 166, 174, 404 S.E.2d 854, 859
(1991). The court stated:
Having held that plaintiff is estopped to deny that a valid agreement for the purchase and
sale of the land existed, we need not address plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment. Also,
since it was not set out in the dissenting opinion as the basis for the dissent pursuant to Rule
16 (b) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, we do not address plaintiff's
claim of breach of contract.
Id.; Shadkhoo v. Shilo East Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 47. 48, 399 S.E.2d 319, 320 (1991). The court
stated:
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 1 [2001], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol24/iss1/3
APPELLATE RULE 16(b)
V. STATE V. KALEY (1996)
In 1996, in State v. Kaley,5' the supreme court decided that Rule
16(b) should not be so narrowly interpreted. In Kaley, the trial court
charged the jury on acting in concert in a second-degree murder trial
which resulted in an involuntary manslaughter conviction. The evi-
dence was that the defendant was the passenger in a car driven by a
man who went to buy crack cocaine. When the automobile pulled to
the curb, the victim leaned in on the passenger side. Either the defen-
dant held the victim or the victim held the defendant while the driver
began to drive away. As the automobile picked up speed, the victim
fell. The automobile ran over her and killed her. The court of appeals
ruled that it was error to charge the jury on acting in concert, accord-
ing to the majority opinion. The court held that there was no evidence
the two men were acting together pursuant to a common plan or pur-
pose to harm or kill the victim when they drove away causing the vic-
tim's death.52
In his dissent, Judge Cozort did not disagree with this conclusion.
Rather, Judge Cozort reasoned that the defendant and the driver were
acting in concert in attempting the "drive-up" purchase of illegal
drugs, that death was a natural and sometimes probable consequence
of such an attempt, and that it was proper for the trial court to instruct
the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter through acting in concert.53 The Kaley majority explained
why it disagreed with the dissent:
We note that ... a defendant is guilty of not only the planned crime,
but of any crime committed by the other person in pursuance of the
common plan or purpose, or as a natural or probable consequence
thereof. The dissent argues that there was a common plan or purpose
In the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court. plaintiff argued that the case was for
the jury under the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The dissenting opinion in the Court of Ap-
peals relates solely to the 'exclusive control' aspect of the res ipsa doctrine. Because this
appeal is before us pursuant to N.C.G.S. 7A-30 (2), our review is limited to the issue raised
in the dissent: whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish the requisite of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur that the speaker, the instrumentality that caused her injury, was
under defendant's exclusive control and management.
Id.; Roberts v. Madison County Realtors Assn., 344 N.C. 394, 398, 474 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1996)
("[B]ecause the Court of Appeals majority and dissent agreed that plaintiff raised issues of fact
concerning the propriety of the procedures followed leading up to the merger, our review is
limited to the issue dissented on: whether plaintiff's claim was rendered moot by the merger.").
But see Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point, 316 N.C. 259, 262, 341 S.E.2d 523, 525
(1986) ("Thus, to the extent that there is technical merit to the plaintiff's contention, we have
chosen to exercise our authority under Appellate Rule 2 to consider the question, since it was
fully argued by both parties.").
51. 343 N.C. 107, 468 S.E.2d 44 (1996).
52. State v. Kaley, 117 N.C. App. 420, 422, 451 S.E.2d 6. 8 (1994), rev'd, 343 N.C. 107, 468
S.E.2d 44 (1996).
53. Id. at 423, 451 S.E.2d at 8.
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to commit the crime of purchasing crack cocaine and that the involun-
tary manslaughter was a natural or probable consequence of that
crime. However, the trial court did not instruct the jury based on that
theory. The instructions made no reference whatsoever to any crimes
other than murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary man-
slaughter. Further, defendant was not even charged with a drug-re-
lated crime. As stated above, there was insufficient evidence to
support the instruction given.
54
The panel of judges in the court of appeals who heard Kaley, thus
appeared not to disagree that the evidence did not show that the occu-
pants of the car acted in concert when the driver drove the car away
while the victim was in close contact with the defendant. Under the
language of Rule 16(b) and the case law interpreting Rule 16(b), this
issue was consequently not before the supreme court on the section
7A-30(2) appeal. Yet, the supreme court held that the court of ap-
peals erred in this conclusion stating that "[w]hen the two men drove
away without paying for the cocaine, it can be concluded that they
planned to drive away without paying for the drugs [and] [t]o drive
away when a person is standing next to the automobile in such close
proximity that the automobile may hit or catch and drag her can be
found to be culpable negligence. This evidence supported the court's
charge on involuntary manslaughter."55
The defendant in Kaley expressly argued that Rule 16(b) limited the
State's right of appeal to the matters which are the basis of the court
of appeals' dissenting opinion so that the State was limited on appeal
to arguing that the attempted purchase of the cocaine was the con-
certed action which would support the charge. Justice Webb for the
court disagreed.
"The dissent was based on the premise that there was evidence to sup-
port a charge of acting in concert. The State can argue in this court
any evidence that supports this premise. It is not limited to arguing
the reasons in the dissent as to why there was evidence to support the
charge. ,
5 6
Kaley thus contradicted the long-held understanding of Rule 16(b)
that it was the issue explicitly discussed by the dissenting judge of the
court of appeals, rather than a broadly defined legal question or pre-
mise, that was before the supreme court on review.57 Kaley thus dis-
pensed with the only logical justification for Rule 16(b) - that
appeals of right should not lie from issues upon which the court of
appeals' panel unanimously agreed. Review of such unanimous mat-
54. Id.
55. Kaley, 343 N.C. at 110, 468 S.E.2d at 46.
56. Id.
57. See discussion supra footnotes 42 and 51 and accompanying text.
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ters was of course available to Kaley through petition for discretionary
review or by Rule 2's suspension of the appellate rules. Thus, it is not
clear why Kaley chose to reinterpret Rule 16(b) instead of suspending
the rules or allowing discretionary review on its own motion in order
to consider the issue.58 In any event, although Kaley confused the
clarity of the Rule 16(b) limitation, the court did justify its approach
by noting that it was reversing the court of appeals on the precise issue
upon which the trial court and the court of appeals had decided the
case.59 Kaley did not claim that Rule 16(b) allowed the court to con-
sider and resolve a case on issues never considered or addressed in the
trial court or court of appeals. However, in a 1998 opinion the su-
preme court, citing Kaley as its precedent, made this claim.
VI. STATE V. FLY (1998)60
One early morning in 1995, Mark Fly "mooned" Barbara Glover.
For exposing his buttocks to Mrs. Glover, Mark Fly was charged with
violating North Carolina's indecent exposure statute, section 14-190.9,
which provides that "[a]ny person who shall willfully expose the pri-
vate parts of his or her person in any public place, and in the presence
of any other person or persons, of the opposite sex... shall be guilty
of a Class 2 misdemeanor."61 The State's evidence was clear that Mr.
Fly willfully exposed his buttocks in a public place, in the presence of
Barbara Glover, a person of the opposite sex. Mr. Fly did not dispute
this evidence, but he did move to dismiss the charge on the grounds
that buttocks were not private parts as defined in section 14-190.9.
The trial court denied defendant's motion and convicted him of inde-
cent exposure.62
58. For instance, in both Jackson v. Housing Authority of High Point, 316 N.C. 259, 262, 341
S.E.2d 523, 525 (1986), and Blumenthal v. Lynch, Sec. of Revenue, 315 N.C. 571, 578, 340 S.E.2d
358, 362 (1986), the court exercised its authority under Rule 2 to hear issues that were not other-
wise before the court under Rule 16(b).
59. State v. Kaley, 343 N.C. 107, 110, 468 S.E.2d 44, 46 (1996) ("We reverse the Court of
Appeals on the issue upon which it decided the case.").
60. State v. Fly, 127 N.C. App. 286, 488 S.E.2d 614 (1997), cert. denied, 348 N.C. 556, 501
S.E.2d 656, rev'd, 348 N.C. 556, 501 S.E.2d 656 (1998).
61. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-190.9 (amending N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-190.9 (1971)). In 1971
the statute provided for a fine not to exceed $500 and imprisonment for up to six months, or
both. In 1993 the statute was amended to provide for punishment as a Class 2 misdemeanor.
62. The judge instructed the jury in essential conformity with the N.C. Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions, Section 238.17: "[To find the defendant guilty of indecent exposure] the State must prove
four things to you beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the Defendant willfully exposed a
private part of his body; second, that the exposure occurred in a public place-that is a place to
which the public has access and is visited by many persons; third, that the exposure was in the
presence of at least one person of the opposite sex; and, fourth, that the Defendant acted will-
fully." After the jury retired, the judge asked if the attorneys had any corrections or additions to
the charge. Defendant's counsel, Ms. Eady, responded: "I might ask the Court to give the Jury
20011
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Fly appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The
court of appeals reversed the conviction holding that buttocks are not
private parts as that term is used in the indecent exposure statute.
The court acknowledged that Mark Fly's actions were indecent and
offensive, but that "indecent" and "offensive" were not elements of
the crime of indecent exposure. The court also acknowledged that
courts are not free to expand what constitutes a crime beyond the
definition clearly provided in the statute.63 Judge Walker dissented
from the majority's opinion, disagreeing with the majority in only one
regard - that section 14-190.9 should be reasonably interpreted to
include buttocks within the meaning of "private parts."64
The State appealed the court of appeals' decision pursuant to sec-
tion 7A-30(2). Rule 16(b) appeared to limit the State to arguing, as
the dissent had, that buttocks were private parts. The State sought,
however, to expand the issues it could argue before the supreme
court, by repeating one argument apparently rejected by all three
judges on the court of appeals, and by raising an argument that had
not been considered by the trial court or the court of appeals. In its
new brief before the supreme court, the State argued: (a) that but-
tocks were private parts within the meaning of the statute; (b) that the
excretory organ, the anus, is a private part within the meaning of the
statute, and that defendant had either actually exposed his anus or
that the buttocks are actually a part of this excretory organ (i.e., "the
flesh covering the anus");65 and (c) that the genital organs, e.g., the
penis and scrotum, are private parts within the meaning of the statute
and that the evidence supported an inference that defendant had "ex-
posed" his genitals in Mrs. Glover's presence even if she had not seen,
and could not have seen, defendant's front.66 To properly present ar-
guments (b) and (c) to the supreme court, the State petitioned the
supreme court for writ of certiorari, as is expressly authorized by Rule
the definition of private parts." The judge, however, declined, stating: "I'm going to wait and see
if they come back for any further instruction on that." Record at 16.
63. Fly, 127 N.C. App. at 289, 488 S.E.2d at 616 (citing State v. Hill, 272 N.C. 439, 443, 158
S.E.2d 329, 332 (1968)) ("It is the legislature that is to define crimes and ordain punishment and
the courts are not permitted to extend the application of the statute 'by implication or equitable
construction' to include acts not clearly within the prohibition.").
64. Fly, 127 N.C. App. at 291, 488 S.E.2d at 617.
65. This argument was made by the State in its brief to the Court of Appeals-but it was
apparently rejected sub silentio by the Court of Appeals panel as the argument is not mentioned
by either majority opinion or dissent. Appellee's Brief at 5.
66. The State did argue in its brief that Mrs. Glover could have seen defendant's genitals if
she had looked but the evidence was clear that Mrs. Glover did look-she made no effort to avert
her gaze, indeed she chased after Mr. Fly-and never saw his genital organs. Appellee's Brief at
2, 5. In its majority opinion, the court of appeals stated: "In this case there is no evidence that
the defendant exposed his genital organs .... " Fly, 127 N.C. App. at 289, 488 S.E.2d at 616
(1997). The dissent nowhere disagreed with this statement.
16
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16(b),67 to consider these additional issues that were not specifically
set out as the basis for the dissent.
The supreme court denied the State's petition for writ of certiorari
on the grounds that Rule 16(b) allowed the court to resolve the case
based upon arguments and theories that were not the basis of the dis-
sent, e.g., theories, (b) and (c) above, so that the writ of certiorari was
unnecessary. 68 The court then proceeded to reverse the court of ap-
peals' decision solely on its determination that under either theory (b)
or (c), the evidence supported a finding that Fly had exposed his pri-
vate parts in Mrs. Glover's presence, thus violating section 14-190.9,
and stated that it was unnecessary to resolve the question raised by
theory (a), i.e., whether or not buttocks were private parts.6 9
Both the express language of Appellate Rule 16, and the supreme
court's pre-Kaley interpretations of the reasons for Rule 16, indicate
that the court should have limited its review in Fly to the single issue
on which the court of appeals' panel did not agree and the issue on
which the court of appeals resolved the case, i.e., whether or not but-
tocks were private parts.
Nevertheless, the supreme court explained that Kaley allowed its
conclusion:
Initially, we address whether the State can present an argument before
this Court that was not the basis of the dissent below. In State v.
Kaley, 343 N.C. 107, 468 S.E.2d 44 (1996), we said the "State can ar-
gue in this Court any evidence that supports [the dissent's] premise. It
is not limited to arguing the reasons in the dissent as to why there was
evidence to support the charge." Id. at 110, 468 S.E.2d at 46. Thus,
because the dissent in this case was based on the premise that there
was sufficient evidence to support the charge of indecent exposure,
the State should not be limited to arguing solely that buttocks are pri-
vate parts. Accordingly, the State is free here to argue any reasoning
it wishes in support of the proposition that the evidence was sufficient
to support defendant's conviction, as that is the issue on appeal before
this Court. Since no writ of certiorari is necessary to permit the State
67. N.C. R. APP. P. 16(b) provides: "Other questions in the case may properly be presented
to the Supreme Court through a petition for discretionary review ... or by a petition for writ of
certiorari."
68. Fly, 348 N.C. at 559, 501 S.E.2d at 658.
69. Despite this conclusion, the supreme court stated in Fly that the court of appeals major-
ity was correct that "buttocks are not private parts within the meaning of the statute." Id. at 561,
501 S.E.2d at 659. This statement is intended dictum which the court included in the opinion
apparently for the sole purpose of justifying the court's conclusion that a person wearing a thong
bikini is not guilty of indecent exposure, an issue which was not before this court in this case.
See id. at 561, 501 S.E.2d at 659. For a more comprehensive analysis of State v. Fly, see Thomas
L. Fowler, Of Moons, Thongs, Holdings and Dicta: State v. Fly and the Rule of Law, 22 CAMP-
BELL L. REV. 253 (2000).
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to make such arguments, its petition for writ of certiorari is hereby
denied.70
VII. STEINGRESS V. STEINGRESS (1999)
Steingress v. Steingress7' also concerned the issue of the scope of the
appeal of right when there is a dissent, but cited neither Kaley nor Fly.
In Steingress, an equitable distribution case, the defendant appealed
the district court's judgment to the court of appeals. The defendant's
appellate brief was not, however, "in the form prescribed by Rule
26(g)" of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.72 Specifically, the text of
defendant's brief was not double-spaced and it did not set out refer-
ences to the assignments of error upon which her issues and argu-
ments were based. In an unpublished opinion,73 the court of appeals
dismissed the defendant's appeal for her failure to file a brief in com-
pliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. In a separate opinion
labeled a dissent, Judge Walker agreed that the brief was not in com-
pliance with the Rules, but that since he was able to determine which
assignments of error were argued in the brief, he would vote to hear
the appeal and tax the attorneys with the appropriate costs for violat-
ing the Rules.
Case law has established that adherence to the Rules of Appellate
Procedure is mandatory and that failure to follow the Rules subjects
an appeal to dismissal. 74  Consistent with this rule, the court of ap-
peals' majority opinion in Steingress explicitly stated: "A violation of
the requirements of Rule 26(g) is sufficient alone to subject the appeal
to dismissal." Judge Walker's dissent did not disagree with this state-
ment, nor did it claim that to dismiss the appeal for such a technical
violation constituted an abuse of discretion. The "dissent" simply
stated that Judge Walker would exercise his discretion differently
from the other two judges that sat on the Steingress panel. Judge
70. Fly, 348 N.C. at 558-59, 501 S.E.2d at 657-58.
71. Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 511 S.E.2d 298 (1999).
72. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b).
73. N.C. R. App. P. 30(e). Rule 30(e) allows the court of appeals to not publish an opinion
if the opinion involved "no new legal principles" and would have "no value as precedent" if
published.
74. See Roberts v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust, 124 N.C. App. 713, 715,478 S.E.2d 809, 810
(1996) (typeface used in appellant's brief violated Rule 26 and was sufficient basis for dismissal
of appeal); Lewis v. Craven Regional Medical Center, 122 N.C. App. 143, 148, 468 S.E.2d 269,
273 (1996) (stating that the specific limitations of Rule 26 will be "applied by this Court to briefs,
petitions, notices of appeal, responses and motions filed after the date of this opinion."); Atlantic
Veneer Corp. v. Robbins, 133 N.C. App. 594, 516 S.E.2d 169 (1999) (stating the Rules of Appel-
late Procedure are mandatory and failure to follow these rules will subject an appeal to dismis-
sal.); Barnard v. Rowland, 132 N.C. App. 416, 420, 512 S.E.2d 458, 462 (1999) ("It should be
unnecessary to reiterate that our appellate rules are mandatory .... and that violation thereof
subject an appeal to dismissal.").
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Walker's separate opinion might, therefore, be viewed more accu-
rately as a concurrence in the result because the judge appeared to
agree that the majority acted within its discretion in dismissing for
technical failure to comply with the Rules and that in such cases an
appeal is properly dismissed when a majority of the court of appeals'
panel vote to dismiss. Under this view, Judge Walker's declaration
that he would have heard the appeal simply notes his disagreement
with the majority on this issue, but does not specify any error in the
majority's decision or the result in the case.
The defendant appealed, as a matter of right pursuant to section
7A-30(2), to the supreme court. The defendant admitted her brief
failed to comply with the applicable rules, but argued that the applica-
tion of the rules should be suspended in her case pursuant to Rule 2 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure to prevent manifest injustice. The
supreme court, per Justice Lake, first found the case inappropriate for
application of Rule 2 because the defendant failed to show the neces-
sary exceptional circumstances of manifest injustice or significant is-
sues of importance to the public interest. The court then turned to
the scope of review when the appeal is of right based on a dissent in
the court of appeals. The court stated:
The dissenting opinion states in its entirety that although defendant's
assignments of error do not comply with the rules, the dissenting judge
is able to determine which assignments are argued in the brief and for
that reason, "'I vote to hear the appeal and tax each attorney with
some appropriate costs for violating the Appellate Rules."' Thus, it
appears the dissenting opinion in this case presents no dividing issue
and is merely a vote in favor of the exercise of discretion to suspend
the rules. "'When an appeal is taken pursuant to [N.C.G.S. § 7A-
30(2)], the only issues properly before the Court are those on which
the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals based his dissent.'
76
Nevertheless, Justice Lake looked for and found a possible issue of
disagreement, not inconsistent with Judge Walker's dissent, stating
75. Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 66, 511 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1999). See also State v.
Fennell, 307 N.C. 258, 263, 297 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1982). The court stated:
[T]he rules of this Court, governing appeals, are mandatory and not directory. They may not
be disregarded or set at naught (1) by act of the Legislature, (2) by order of the judge of the
Superior Court, (3) by consent of litigants or counsel. The Court has not only found it neces-
sary to adopt them, but equally necessary to enforce them and to enforce them uniformly.
... The work of the Court is constantly increasing, and, if it is to keep up with its docket,
which it is earnestly striving to do, an orderly procedure, marked by a due observance of the
rules, must be maintained. When litigants resort to the judiciary for the settlement of their
disputes, they are invoking a public agency, and they should not forget that rules of proce-
dure are necessary, and must be observed, in order to enable the courts properly to dis-
charge their duties.
Id.
76. Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 66, 511 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1999) (quoting Clifford v.
River Bend Plantation, Inc., 312 N.C. 460, 463, 323 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1984)).
20011
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that the court of appeals' majority abused its discretion in failing to
apply Rule 2 to hear defendant's appeal despite the non-compliance
with the rules. As stated above, this was not the express basis of
Judge Walker's opinion in Steingress. Justice Lake then concluded
that no such abuse of discretion had been shown, and affirmed the
court of appeals' majority.
Justice Frye, joined by Justices Parker and Orr, dissented. The dis-
senters did not address the limited scope of review under section 7A-
30(2), as discussed in the majority's opinion, Rule 16(b), or the one
case cited by the majority, Clifford v. River Bend Plantation, Inc.
Neither did the dissenters cite Kaley or Fly. However, the dissent did
follow the Kaley/Fly analysis. Without focusing on the precise lan-
guage of Judge Walker's dissent, the dissenters stated that "the ques-
tion raised is whether dismissal of the appeal was proper. '77 As in
Kaley and Fly, the Steingress dissenters ignored the precise basis speci-
fied in the court of appeals' dissent in order to broadly define the
premise or question raised, and to allow consideration of any argu-
ment that supported the premise or question without regard as to
whether that argument had been considered or addressed by the court
of appeals' majority or dissenter. The Steingress dissent concluded
that the matter should have been remanded to the court of appeals
not because the majority abused its discretion in dismissing the case,
but because before dismissing a case for substantial violation of the
appellate rules, Rule 34(d) requires that the offending party be af-
forded the opportunity to show cause "why this most drastic sanction
should not be imposed.
78
VIII. CONCLUSION
The 1983 amendment to Rule 16 provides that when the sole
ground for the appeal of right is the existence of a dissent in the court
of appeals, the supreme court's review is limited to "those questions
which are ... specifically set out in the dissenting opinion as the basis
for that dissent." This language appears to clearly state a rule that the
supreme court's scope of review is limited to the specific point of disa-
greement actually expressed by the dissenting court of appeals judge.
Any doubt as to this meaning should have been resolved by the
Walker Grading & Hauling case. Walker was a summary judgment
case. The dissenting judge's unexplained dissent clearly implicated
the broad premise or question as to whether summary judgment was
proper. Nevertheless, Walker held that broad premise was not before
the court under a section 7A-30(2) appeal of right. The only issue
77. Steingress, 350 N.C. at 67, 511 S.E.2d at 300 (Frye, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 70, 511 S.E.2d at 302 (Frye, J., dissenting).
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properly before the court on a section 7A-30(2) appeal of right was
the specific point (or points) of disagreement actually expressed by
the dissenting court of appeals' judge in his or her opinion.
Rule 16(b) appears to have been a logical response to the expansive
interpretation of section 7A-30(2) adopted by Williams v. Williams.
As discussed previously, most jurisdictions that have created interme-
diate appellate courts have eliminated or minimized appeals of right
to their court of last resort. Narrowly limiting the scope of review of
cases involving appeals of right from cases with lower court dissents,
accomplishes the goal of maximizing the highest court's discretionary
jurisdiction without sacrificing the error correction goal. Litigants are
granted the right to one appeal in the court of appeals, with no right to
further appeal, except for issues on which the court of appeals' panel
was in express disagreement. Rule 16(b), as interpreted by Walker
and subsequent cases,7 9 thus accommodated both the protection of
the error correction function and the expansion of the supreme court's
law development function.
In Kaley, Fly, and Steingress, however, the supreme court has ig-
nored or devalued both the language of and the purpose behind Rule
16(b) and the case law that focused on this language and explained the
purpose behind Rule 16(b). In light of these cases, it is no longer clear
that the court will follow the ruling in Harris v. Maready that an opin-
ion improperly labeled a dissent confers no right to appeal under sec-
tion 7A-30(2)," ° or the ruling in Walker that an unexplained dissent
confers no right to appeal under section 7A-30(2).8" It does appear
clear that in the wake of these three cases, the supreme court is willing
to resolve these kinds of cases on the basis of arguments and theories
that were never addressed by the lower courts.
For litigants whose cases have been resolved by a divided panel of
the court of appeals, the question remains as to whether they have the
right to the expanded scope of review as applied in Kaley, Fly, and
Steingress, or if they should always seek discretionary review of any
issues that were not expressly discussed in the dissent, but that could
be considered reviewable as a part of the section 7A-30(2) appeal of
right under Kaley, Fly, and Steingress. The conservative attorney will
79. See supra, note 50.
80. Although this issue was raised by the Steingress majority, it apparently was not deemed
dispositive, as it should have been under Harris. Additionally, the three dissenting justices ig-
nored the issue entirely despite its mention by the majority.
81. Kaley and Fly, and to some extent Steingress, reveal a supreme court willing to look
beyond the specifics of the court of appeals' dissent to what might have been the basis for the
dissent. If the supreme court is not limited to reviewing the points of disagreement actually
expressed in the dissent, then there is no basis for the Walker holding-that is, a dissent need not
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seek such discretionary review. Questions remain about the long-
term impact of the Kaley and Fly analysis. The only supreme court
case that cites Kaley is Fly, and Fly has yet to be cited. Steingress cited
only the pre-Kaley and Fly case of Clifford v. River Bend. It may be
that the court will reconsider its approach to this issue for it has been
noted that individual justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court
"have voiced their opinions that they would like to see the automatic
right of appeal based on dissent eliminated by the General Assem-
bly." 82 In the meantime, however, if the supreme court denies the
motion for discretionary review, the appellant's attorney may still
seek to make the additional arguments as a part of the appeal of right,
citing Kaley and Fly as authority.83
If the supreme court determines, consistent with Kaley and Fly, that
the section 7A-30(2) appellant has the right to supreme court review
of all issues and arguments that the appellant can muster that support
the broad question or premise raised by the dissent, regardless of
whether these issues or arguments were the expressed basis for the
dissent, then the court will have expanded the mandatory appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court, contrary to its interest in maximiz-
ing its law development function. If, on the other hand, the supreme
court determines that the appellant lacks the right to insist on its re-
view of these new issues and arguments but that the court can do so or
not in its discretion, then the court will have created a new category of
discretionary review that is not subject to any of the guidelines estab-
82. "By forcing the supreme court to hear all cases in which there is a dissent, it is believed
that the court is forced to expend its limited time and resources hearing cases that do not involve
novel or important claims. Consequently, the court would prefer to hear these cases on a discre-
tionary basis." NORTH CAROLINA TRIAL AND APPEAL, Appellate Jurisdiction, 11-3 (1998) (em-
phasis added).
83. Fly clearly states that the appellant is "free ... to argue any reasoning it wishes" to
support the proposition that the court finds is the issue before it. This presumably means that no
permission from the court is required. If the parties are free to fashion any argument that ad-
dresses the "premise" of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the charges, then [in State v.
Fly] the supreme court would presumably have considered a contention raised for the first time
in the defendant's brief to the supreme court, that the State's evidence failed to show that Mrs.
Glover was a person of the opposite sex (which is an element of the crime of indecent exposure).
One danger of considering arguments that were not addressed in the lower courts, of course, is
that the factual and legal issues may not have been fully developed below leading to incomplete
understanding by the supreme court. In State v. Fly, the supreme court based its holding on its
belief that the evidence supported the conclusions that Mr. Fly actually exposed his anus and
that Mrs. Glover was in a position to see Mr. Fly's genital organs even if she did not actually
view them. Yet Mrs. Glover's uncontradicted testimony was that she made no effort to avoid
looking at Mr. Fly, that she saw everything that she was in a position to see, and that she did not
see Mr. Fly's anus or genital organs. State v. Fly, 348 N.C. 556, 559, 501 S.E.2d 656, 658 (1998).
It seems clear that the parties and the court of appeals had concluded that there was no evidence
that Mr. Fly had exposed his anus or genital organs as required by the indecent exposure statute.
Fly 127 N.C. App. 286, 289, 488 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1997) ("In this case there is no evidence that
the defendant exposed his genital organs ....").
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lished by section 7A-31 or by case law. Such a new category of discre-
tionary review is incompatible with either of the two important
functions of appellate courts. The litigant's appeal of right is the abso-
lute right of the litigant to have certain matters reviewed. This right of
review should not depend on the supreme court's discretion. The su-
preme court is also empowered, under Appellate Rule 2, and North
Carolina General Statutes sections 7A-31 and 7A-32, to determine,
even on its own motion, whether to hear certain cases or issues. If the
court felt that the issues in Kaley, Fly and Steingress were not properly
reviewable pursuant to Rule 2, sections 7A-31 or 7A-32, for instance
because the issue lacked significant public interest or involved no legal
principles of major significance, then the supreme court was not au-
thorized to review these issues in its discretion.
In a 1934 case, on appeal to the supreme court, the appellants made
several arguments as to why they should prevail on one issue. The
supreme court refused to consider one of the arguments stating that
its review of the record disclosed "that the cause was not tried upon
that theory, and the law does not permit parties to swap horses be-
tween courts in order to get a better mount in the [North Carolina]
Supreme Court."84 Since 1934 this principle has been consistently
cited by our courts85 and restated as: "[W]e cannot review the case as
the parties might have tried it; rather, we must review the case as tried
below, as reflected in the record on appeal."86 In section 7A-30(2)
cases, expanding the theories that can be argued beyond those that
were the express basis for the dissent, might also be viewed as a pro-
hibited horse swap.87
84. Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934).
85. See, State v. Sharpe, 344 N.C. 190. 194-95, 473 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1996). The court stated:
This Court has long held that where a theory argued on appeal was not raised before the
trial court, 'the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a
better mount in the Supreme Court.' (quoting Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836,
838 (1934)) (citations omitted) . Here, defendant argued to the trial court - expressly, exten-
sively, and with citations of authority - only that the proffered evidence should be admitted
under the state of mind and dying declarations exceptions to the rule against hearsay. The
State responded only to those arguments, and the trial court expressly ruled on admissibility
only under those grounds .... Under these circumstances, it is well settled in this jurisdic-
tion that defendant cannot argue for the first time on appeal this new ground for admissibil-
ity that he did not present to the trial court.
Id.
86. Tallent v. Blake, 57 N.C. App. 249, 252, 291 S.E.2d 336, 339 (1982) ("The theory upon
which the case was tried must prevail in considering the appeal, interpreting the record, and
determining the validity of exceptions .... A party may not acquiesce in the trial of his case
upon one theory below and then argue on appeal that it should have been tried upon another.").
87. Clearly, the appellate courts' interchangeable use of the terms "theory," "question,"
"proposition," and "issue," which may refer to distinct levels of legal reasoning or may be used
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